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In its World Investment Report 2011, UNCTAD reported that liberalizing investment policy 
measures taken globally in 2010 outnumbered restrictive measures.1 Without the benefit of 
statistics, investors might have drawn the opposite conclusion, witnessing what appears to be a 
rising tide of national resistance to foreign takeovers: the Australian Foreign Investment Review 
Board’s rejection of a takeover of the Australian Securities Exchange by the Singapore 
Exchange, Italian concern over a French company’s takeover of dairy giant Parmalat and the US 
Government’s requirement that Chinese company Huawei divest certain assets it had acquired 
from 3Leaf. 
 
In Canada, the rejection by the Canadian Government of the takeover of Potash Corporation of 
Saskatchewan (PotashCorp) by Australian mining giant BHP Billiton (BHP) has raised similar 
anxieties. However, closer scrutiny of the PotashCorp decision reveals that it does not portend a 
sea-change in the foreign investment review process in Canada. Rather, it underlines that politics 
can occasionally hijack the review of foreign investments, in contrast to other areas of law (such 
as merger control under competition law) that tend to have a more predictable, less open-ended 
framework of analysis. 
 
The PotashCorp decision represented only the second time in Canada’s history of foreign 
investment review legislation (Investment Canada Act or ICA) that a foreign investment outside 
the cultural sector has been rejected. PotashCorp is the largest producer of potash (a key 
ingredient in fertilizer), reported to have about 20% of global potash capacity. The Canadian 
Government found that BHP’s bid did not meet the “net benefit to Canada” test for approval 
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under the ICA. Among other factors, the Canadian Government was not satisfied that BHP was 
prepared to make sufficient commitments in respect of capital expenditures or PotashCorp’s 
membership in the potash export consortium, Canpotex.2 At the time, the federal Minister of 
Agriculture also referred to potash as a “strategic resource.”3 
 
Despite these explanations, the PotashCorp decision is properly viewed as an exceptional and 
largely political response to a number of factors: 
 
• The Premier of Saskatchewan’s success in galvanizing opposition to the deal across 
Canada, based on expressed concerns over a significant reduction in tax revenues and 
foreign ownership of a “strategic” resource. 
• The ruling Conservative Party’s minority government status, which made it vulnerable to 
a potential loss of seats in the 2011 election -- particularly in the province of 
Saskatchewan where there was strong support for the Premier’s opposition. 
• The hostile nature of BHP’s bid. 
 
The absence of official reasons for the PotashCorp decision fostered anxiety about the 
Government’s openness to foreign investment. This was particularly the case in light of the 
significant and, in some respects, unprecedented undertakings BHP had offered Canada. The 
latter included foregoing tax benefits, remaining a member of the Canpotex potash export 
consortium for five years and establishing its global headquarters in Saskatoon. BHP also offered 
a US$ 250 million performance bond to the Government to backstop its undertakings, likely to 
allay public concerns about compliance. 
 
There are (at least) three lessons to be drawn from this decision. First, potential stakeholders in 
the Investment Canada process, particularly the provinces, have learned that political agitation 
can yield concrete results. However, whether this lesson will translate readily to other 
transactions is open to question: provincial leaders typically have more diverse and conflicting 
constituencies than Saskatchewan where the potash industry is very significant, and the federal 
government is no longer politically fragile, having won majority government status in May of 
2011. 
 
Second, the Canadian Government is sensitive to criticism that its decision regarding PotashCorp 
could discourage foreign investment in Canada and, accordingly, has portrayed this case as 
exceptional and not indicative of a potentially worrisome trend of deploying national interest 
tests in a way that impedes the flow of international investment.4 Indeed, no deals have been 
rejected in the year since the decision, although it is telling that the Government has still not 
brought into force a 2009 amendment to the ICA that would increase the review threshold and 
thereby reduce the number of foreign investments subject to review. 
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Third, some foreign investors may increasingly turn to self-help measures to address uncertainty 
over the Government’s approach to foreign investment. For example, by making minority 
investments of less than a third of a corporation’s shares, foreign investors can avoid scrutiny 
under the ICA, unless the investment is potentially injurious to Canada’s national security. In 
addition, in the resources sector, foreign businesses may negotiate “off-take agreements” 
entitling them to a share of production as a means of securing access to natural resources. 
 
Investors can take comfort that the PotashCorp decision does not signal a new protectionism in 
Canada. Nevertheless, in Canada as elsewhere, foreign investors must be alert to the possibility 
that political sensitivities may jeopardize a small number of deals involving perceived national 
champions. 
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